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O

ne of the most well known, but deeply debated, ideas presented by the
philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche, is the will to power. Scholars have
provided a variety of interpretations for what Nietzsche means by
this concept. In this paper, I argue that, under each interpretation,
Nietzsche may still face what I call, the problem of moral chaos, or the problem of
endorsing the claim that immoral acts, such as murder and torture, are justiﬁable
as they exemplify the human will towards power over others. I ultimately argue
that Nietzsche’s philosophy avoids this problem: though Nietzsche proposes it is
possible to harm others as a way to power, we should not direct our will to power
in this manner. To illustrate this point, I investigate common interpretations of the
will to power, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most compelling.
From here, I demonstrate through Nietzsche’s passages that he clearly inspires
humanity to direct the will to power towards individual inner growth, and not
as a form of domination. Therefore, Nietzsche does not fall into the problem of
moral chaos.
Part I. The Will to Power: Metaphysical, Metaphorical or Psychological?
In order to understand the moral connotations of the will to power, we need
to ﬁrst determine what Nietzsche really means by the will to power. There
are generally three different interpretations: the metaphysical, metaphorical,
and psychological interpretations. In this part, I examine each of these
interpretations, arguing that the psychological interpretation is the most
compelling.
Those who explain the will to power as a metaphysical description of nature
assert that Nietzsche expresses the will to power as being the nature of reality,
and of all things inorganic or organic. There are two essential components
to this metaphysical interpretation: human beings and the world. Regarding
human beings, the will to power is emphasized as something real in human
behavior. A being is presented as different forces of energy that are constantly
ﬁghting for power (Danto 2005, 199-200). In his posthumously published
notes, Nietzsche presents the will to power as a system of “dynamic quanta”
(WP:635), where such quanta are in a relationship of struggling to overpower
one another. This power must be commanded or balanced to promote a
healthy individual. If it is not, and one force has excess power in deﬁcient
areas, then the individual is insufﬁcient, sick, or weak (Richardson 1996,
39-43).

60 • THE UNDERGRADUATE REVIEW • 2010

BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

The world is also understood as will to power. John Richardson
(2006) maintains that Nietzsche characterizes all of nature as
the will to power. Nietzsche introduces this idea in Beyond
Good and Evil, where he states:
Suppose, ﬁnally, we succeeded in explaining our entire
instinctive life as the development and ramiﬁcation
of one basic form of the will—namely, of the will to
power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic
functions could be traced back to this[,] […]then one
would have gained the right to determine all efﬁcient
force univocally as –will to power. (BGE:36)
This passage illustrates that Nietzsche was working with
the theory that all things are reduced to the one underlying
metaphysical substance that he calls the will to power. Nietzsche
describes this substance as a “dynamic quanta” of energy and
a “force” (WP:619) that is directed outward to overcome,
master, or encapsulate other wills. According to Richardson,
the will to power is an act of “taking power over something
else, ‘incorporating’ it” (Richardson 1996, 22). All things in
nature are consuming other things in an act for power and
growth. As Nietzsche puts it, “This world is the will to power—
and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to
power—and nothing besides!” (WP:1067). Thus, following
this interpretation, we are a force of power. Whether power is
described as an “effortful pursuit” (Richardson 1996, 22) or a
drive to “overcome obstacles” (Danto 2005, 207), it is always
what we are. Here, power is a drive in everything to move
outward and consume space.
Although the metaphysical interpretation can be supported
in Nietzsche’s writings, I argue that there are several problems
with this interpretation. First, it is based primarily on
Nietzsche’s notes and not his originally published works and it
is inadequate to base an interpretation on information arrived
at through Nietzsche’s notes, as it may be the case that these
ideas weren’t fully developed yet. Second, this interpretation
is inconsistent with Nietzsche’s ideas in his published works
because it conﬂicts with his view of perspectivism, the epistemic
claim that we only have knowledge and understanding
through our human perspective, and know nothing beyond
this. According to perspectivism, we cannot see the world-initself, or the metaphysically real world, but only a world that
is envisioned through our human perspective. Therefore, we
can never truly know anything about nature. However, the
metaphysical interpretation implies that we can know the truth
about nature, since nature truly is the will to power. Thus, there
is an inconsistency between this interpretation and Nietzsche’s
perspectivism. Third, when we examine Nietzsche’s published
accounts of the will to power, we ﬁnd he primarily presents the
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will to power only in humanity, and not in nature as a whole
(see, for example, GM:II:12; GM:III:18; BGE: 19; BGE:259;
Z:II:2). It is only obvious in his notes that he expands the notion
to nature. So, though this interpretation may be grounded in
Nietzsche’s notes, it is inconsistent with his published ideas on
the will to power.
Finally, Nietzsche’s published passages of the will to power that
seem to suggest a metaphysical interpretation can be explained
in a non-metaphysical sense. Take a famous passage, BGE:36,
as an example. Aphorism 36 seems to be expressing that all of
nature is will to power. However, Maudemarie Clark (1990)
and Linda L. Williams (1996) each identify that this passage
has a “hypothetical form” (Williams 1996, 454). Nietzsche
begins with the statement, “Suppose all organic functions could
be traced back to this will to power [.]” Thus, since it is a
hypothetical statement, it is a mistake to say that Nietzsche here
espouses the reality of the content made in the hypothetical
statement; rather Nietzsche is only ‘speaking hypothetically,’ as
it were. For these reasons, then, we can dismiss the metaphysical
interpretation.
The next view, the metaphorical interpretation, maintains that,
since we cannot know anything about the world-in-itself, we
must create a ﬁction for the human world, thereby creating
meaning in our lives. Nietzsche does this by creating the will to
power, a ﬁctional worldview. The will to power is thus not real
in nature or humanity, but is, as Wayne Klein puts it, “one way
among others of describing nature, a form of description that
Nietzsche recognizes as explicitly metaphorical” (Klein 1997,
156). This metaphorical description is valuable for Nietzsche,
as it is a creation that inspires humanity to say “yes” to life.
Nietzsche proclaims, “For the game of creation, my brothers,
a scared ‘yes’ is needed” (Z:I:1). Here, “The game of creation”
is a ﬁction that establishes value in life, allowing us to embrace
life and derive strength from it.
According to this interpretation, Nietzsche created the ﬁction
of the will to power because he values humanity’s strength in
life. Instead of viewing the will to power as real in humanity,
here it is understood as a perspective of Nietzsche’s that he
places onto humanity. Following perspectivism, the will to
power is one perspective Nietzsche offers as a means to envision
the world. If we accept this image, we will constantly strive to
overcome what we are and better ourselves or, in Nietzsche’s
words, through the process of overcoming, “you shall become
the person you are” (GS:III:270).
I maintain that this interpretation falls short as well. First, there
are passages from Nietzsche’s published works that describe the
will to power as a psychological drive in all humanity, which
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cannot be explained by the metaphorical interpretation. For
example, in BGE:259 Nietzsche explains that each human being
has a will to power and hence “belong[s] to the essence of what
lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will
to power, which is after all the will of life” (BGE:259). Since we
have already determined that the metaphysical interpretation
is incorrect, and because here Nietzsche describes the essence
of human beings, we can clearly understand this passage as a
psychological explanation of humanity. Nietzsche is proposing
that the will to power is an observed psychological trait in
humanity, and not just any trait, but the trait that motivates
human beings to live. The metaphorical interpretation cannot
explain this passage, as Nietzsche makes no indication here
that he implies the will to power as a psychological metaphor.
Instead, he expresses it as a literal psychological characteristic in
human nature. Second, the metaphorical interpretation doesn’t
provide criteria to determine which passages and ideas of
Nietzsche’s are ﬁctional and which are not. Though Nietzsche
endorses perspectivism, he allows for one to have knowledge
about human truths. Since Nietzsche allows for human
truths in his philosophy, this implies that some of the ideas
or observations he describes about humanity are real. Now,
given this point, although it is not inconsistent to determine
that the will to power is a ﬁction for Nietzsche, following the
metaphorical interpretation there is no deciding factor for why
this is so. Here, the metaphorical interpretation faces a slippery
slope. If the will to power is considered a ﬁction and there is
no criterion to adjudicate ﬁctions from human truths, then
all of Nietzsche’s explanations are ﬁctitious. But this entails
an inconsistency with Nietzsche’s purported truths about
humanity. Thus, due to these reasons, I reject the metaphorical
interpretation as an accurate account of the will to power.
The ﬁnal interpretation of the will to power, the psychological
interpretation, emphasizes the will to power as a secondary
drive that inﬂuences ﬁrst order drives. In other words, it is
a drive to overcome or improve our desires, activities, and
passions. For instance, one may have a ﬁrst order drive, or
desire, to be a writer, while the secondary drive – the will to
power – underlies this desire and psychologically motivates one
to overcome, or become better as a writer. The psychological
interpretation proposes that Nietzsche conveys the will to
power as only a drive in humanity. Rex Welshon explains that
power for Nietzsche is striving to better one’s own activities
and passions (Welshon 2004, 180-181). Nietzsche suggests
this point in The Genealogy of Morals as he describes the will
to power as “the strongest, most life-afﬁrming drive” and states
that we are “obedient […] to the same basic instinct” (GM:
III:18). That is, the will to power is a drive in humanity and
an instinct inherent in us. Furthermore, Welshon notes that
the will to power (the secondary drive) shapes a speciﬁc desire
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(the primary drive) by constructing a new ability and changing
not just a person’s ability, but his or her whole self (Welshon
2004, 180-182). This is related to Nietzsche’s notion of selfovercoming, as “realizing a drive or intention, the activity
itself […] can result in our overcoming our goal in pursuing
it” (181). Through shaping our activities, the will to power
allows us to overcome ourselves by changing or growing, which
reconstructs our whole being so that we have not just obtained
a goal, but changed something fundamental in ourselves.
I maintain that one can defend the psychological reading of
the will to power from common objections presented against
it. The ﬁrst objection holds that this interpretation cannot
account for Nietzsche’s obvious endorsement of humanity
creating a ﬁctitious world, in passages like BGE:5, where
Nietzsche speaks of philosophers creating “truths” and openly
accepts that we create the world through images. To defend
the psychological interpretation against this argument we must
return to Nietzsche’s perspectivism and acceptance of human
truths. If we consider the will to power a human truth about
human psychology, then this interpretation is still consistent
with BGE:5. In this case, the will to power as a psychological
drive urges philosophers speciﬁcally to ﬁnd truths about the
world-in-itself. Since they cannot ﬁnd such truths, philosophers
create truths from their own values that they believe to be real
truths about nature, so as to fulﬁll their need for understanding.
These truths however, are not real about nature. Therefore,
philosophers are only creating ﬁctions. Thus, following the
psychological interpretation, the will to power is a human
truth, meaning it is something we can observe in humanity
through the human perspective. It is not something we have
created, but something we recognize as a drive in humanity
that motivates us to create an image of the world through our
values.
A second objection holds that the will to power cannot be an
underlying psychological drive for human beings because we
ﬁrst need a primary desire, and then we feel the motivation for
growth and overcoming in this desire (Clark 1990, 211). I argue
that this objection fails because it is conceivable for the will to
power to exist independent of any other drive. It is common to
feel the need to struggle and better oneself without that need
being initially inspired from a speciﬁc desire. It is plausible to
have an underlying drive to struggle to overcome and then
focus or direct that drive onto one’s passions and desires. For
example, I may love to write, but my wanting to write better
could come from the general motivation or desire to overcome
all obstacles, and thus I would focus this drive towards writing
because I enjoy doing it. Also, I may feel the desire to master
any skill, so as to better myself or be the best at something,
where the activity I am mastering is of less importance than the
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

feeling of mastering, itself. It is possible, then, for one to have
a drive to struggle before having a desire. As Nietzsche puts it,
“What does not kill me makes me stronger” (TI:Maxims:8),
thereby suggesting the inherent value of struggling, itself.
Thus, after examining all three interpretations of the will to
power, I ﬁnd that the psychological interpretation is the most
compelling. This interpretation can defend all the objections
presented against it, which the metaphysical and metaphorical
cannot do. It has no strong arguments to refute it. Having
determined that the psychological interpretation is the correct
account, we must now question if the will to power leads to the
problem of moral chaos.
Part II. The Will to Power: Strong Overmen
or Brutal Tyrants?
In this part, I explore two questions: (1) Does Nietzsche
maintain, descriptively, that violence can be a form of the will
to power?, and (2) Does Nietzsche, normatively, maintain that
one should perform violent acts to increase power? I argue that
though the answer to the former is yes, the answer to the latter
is no, thereby showing us why Nietzsche’s will to power does
not lead to the problem of moral chaos.
Through two speciﬁc passages from Nietzsche concerning the
will to power, we can clearly observe that he does recognize
these harmful acts towards others as an expression of the will
to power. The ﬁrst passage presents the will to power in those
who are strong:
Human beings whose nature was still natural,
barbarians […] men of prey who were still in
possession of unbroken strength of will and lust for
power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more civilized,
more peaceful races[.…] Their predominance did not
lie mainly in physical strength but in strength of the
soul[.](BGE:257)
Nietzsche describes the will to power in these “barbarians”
through their attacking and dominating of weaker societies.
We normally understand barbarians as those who have
little sympathy, are uncaring, and are cruel. It is clear that
Nietzsche traces these uncaring and unsympathetic acts of men
dominating weaker men as an example of the will to power.
Notice, however, that he describes these individuals as growing
in their soul and not simply in physical strength. Although it
can be directed in different ways, any overcoming is a form of
the will to power, and Nietzsche illustrates here that these men
are overcoming by dominating the weak.

“The will of the weak to represent some form of superiority,
their instinct for devious paths to tyranny over the healthy—
where can it not be discovered, this will to power of the
weakest!” (GM:III:14). Nietzsche explains that the will to
power is even in the weakest of beings, but it is also expressed
here as tyranny, domination, and oppression of others. As
Kaufmann explains, “[t]he assumption is that the powerful
and the impotent are both imbued with the will to power, and
that extreme or prolonged oppression and frustration may
easily pervert this drive and make the oppressed look for petty
occasions to assert their will to power by being cruel to others”
(Kauffman 1974, 194). The act of hurting is not the expression
of the will to power for the weak. It’s the superiority they feel
in hurting others and a feeling of strength from this superiority
is how they self-overcome (191). They become stronger and
more assertive individuals by overpowering others. They grow
inwardly by harming outwardly.
Thus, after examining these two passages, it follows that
Nietzsche accepts domination and cruelty of others as a form
of the will to power. Since the will to power is the drive for selfovercoming, as long as individuals are growing and recreating
themselves in some way, any act is a form of will to power
whether it is harmful or generous. The answer then to the ﬁrst
question is yes, harmful and violent acts towards others are a
form of the will to power.
We now need to determine if Nietzsche believes we should use
violence as a way to gain power. If so, then the problem of
moral chaos arises, because he would endorse a society whose
members torture, murder, and manipulate others for their
own gain. However, if not, then Nietzsche avoids the problem
of moral chaos, because he will promote a society whose
individuals focus on themselves in an effort to self-overcome
and will not dominate and harm others as a means for strength.
Richardson argues that Nietzsche expects humanity to use
violence as a form of struggling to gain the greatest amount
of strength that is possible for them (Richardson 1996,
30). The argument here is that some of Nietzsche’s passages
unmistakably praise injury, violence, and exploitation of other
individuals as a way to gain power. Richardson explains that,
for Nietzsche, “[a] drive’s strength level is measured by whether
it is able to rule or master others in some way […] whereas
growth or decline lies in ruling more or fewer […]” (30). He
further holds that Nietzsche accepts violence and domination
as one of the primary struggles for gaining the highest degree
of power, claiming that “he most often and most emphatically
identiﬁes growth as ‘increased’ mastery of others” (32).
However, there is some bias in Richardson’s assessment that

The second passage presents the will to power in the weak:
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Nietzsche accepts violence as a means to power. Richardson’s
argument springs from the metaphysical interpretation and,
therefore, is faulty. When arguing that Nietzsche endorses
violence through the will to power, Richardson writes, “will
to power aims at a real condition, speciﬁed independently
of any perspectives about power” (Richardson 1996, 32).
We have already determined though, that, for Nietzsche, we
cannot disconnect ourselves from our perspectives, so the will
to power cannot be explained as a phenomenon we understand
contrary to a perspective. This is precisely what Richardson is
claiming when he suggests that Nietzsche endorses mastery over
others as a primary means towards power, because the drive for
power is something fundamentally real in everything. Thus,
Richardson’s argument fails because it is dependent upon the
metaphysical interpretation of the will to power, and so carries
with it, all of the problems attached to this interpretation.
Richardson also argues that there are passages from Nietzsche
that suggest violent acts towards others should be a primary
direction of the will to power. For instance, Nietzsche declares,
“mankind in the mass sacriﬁced to the prosperity of a single
stronger species of man—that would be an advance” (GM:
II:12). This statement appears to endorse harmful acts or
manipulation of other beings for one’s own sake. However,
neither here nor anywhere else in this passage does Nietzsche
refer to a sacriﬁce as something violent or harmful for this mass
of mankind. Nietzsche elsewhere explains the sacriﬁce of the
weak as “serving a higher sovereign species that stands upon
the former and can raise itself to its task only by doing this”
(WP:898). Nietzsche here does not propose that the strongest
men harm the weak, but that they must stand upon them.
That is, the strong need the weak to achieve their strength.
Furthermore, it is not evident that Nietzsche describes his ideal
being, who he calls the overman (Z:P:3), as dominating or
using weaker wills in a harmful or violent manner.2 He describes
‘strong men’ or ‘barbarians’ as being harmful to others, but this
is not the overman. He may respect the strength in these brutal
types, but he aspires for us to become overmen, not barbarians.
Nietzsche advocates a struggle to improve ourselves beyond
what we have ever achieved. He urges us to advance beyond
this master morality (BGE:260) and become overmen, and he
does not associate violence with these men.3
Thus, although Nietzsche has a few passages that initially appear
to endorse or lead to violent and harmful acts towards others,
when examining these passages closely and relating them to the
rest of his philosophy it is evident that they are not advocating
violence and torture towards others. Nietzsche is presenting his
description of human nature and his admiration of creation
here. He illustrates, not that there are violent traits in humanity
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that must be intensiﬁed, but merely that humanity already has
such traits, and we must accept this before we can further
advance our species.
Following Kaufmann, I maintain that while Nietzsche
acknowledges harmful and violent acts towards others as a way
to power, he does not encourage humanity to direct their will to
power in this form. Kaufmann argues that “[w]hile Nietzsche,
as a psychological observer, offers no evaluation, it is plain that
he does not consider the neurotic’s will to power admirable.
[…] [A] will to power is recognized of which Nietzsche, by
all indications, does not approve” (Kaufmann 1974, 184).
Nietzsche does not approve of weak individuals harming others
as a direction of their will to power because “the will to power
is a positive motive which would make us strive for something”
(1974, 190).What is important for Nietzsche is that the will
to power is a drive to overcome, not that one can be driven to
violence. This drive towards self-overcoming inspires us to be
beyond what we are today, what we are this very moment. And
for Nietzsche this is life afﬁrming, which is one of his most
esteemed aspirations.
In Twilight of the Idols we may identify Nietzsche’s admiration
of overcoming, as well as his disregard for either a domineering
ruler or a weak slave for others to rule. He writes, “How is
freedom measured, in individuals[.…] One would have to seek
the highest type of free man where the greatest resistance is
constantly being overcome: ﬁve steps from tyranny, near the
threshold of the danger of servitude” (TI:Untimely Man:38).
Here, Nietzsche explains that the highest man is one who must
always overcome. He is close to servitude, but not a servant,
because if he was a servant he would not be able to struggle to
overcome; he would be crushed instead. But this man is also
not a tyrant, because if he were a tyrant he would care only for
what he acquired and not for his inner growth and personal
strength. Nietzsche makes it clear here that the highest man,
the freest man, is the one who is neither a tyrant dominating
weaker beings nor a servant who cannot rule himself.
Not only does Nietzsche expect us to avoid becoming tyrants in
the quest for power, but there comes a point where the strongest
man can be more merciful and less harmful than we are today.
In The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche discusses a society that
is so strong it has no use for such notions as exploitation to the
individuals within it:
It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such
a consciousness of power that it could allow itself the
noblest luxury possible to it—letting those who harm
it go unpunished. […]This self-overcoming of justice:
one knows the beautiful name it has given itself—
BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

mercy; it goes without saying that mercy remains the
privilege of the most powerful man, of better, his—
beyond the law. (GM:II:10)
Nietzsche maintains here that the will to power may lead us
to become so strong a society of individuals that we will not
need to punish or harm others. He equates this act of “mercy”
to “overcoming itself,” which is something he regards as
beautiful. Following Kaufmann, we can say that such acts are
part of Nietzsche’s ideal direction of the will to power since
although “the will to power may be ruthless and a source of evil
doing [,] power itself does not corrupt but ennobles the mind”
(Kaufmann 1974, 194). Mercy, then, is one form of nobility.
Thus, Nietzsche ﬁnds this expression of the will to power
superior to an expression of strength derived from violence.
Although Nietzsche does acknowledge violence and domination
as a form of the will to power, and even at times praises master
morality as one of strength, I argue that this is only a descriptive
tool for him. He uses this type of man to illustrate strength and
counters it with those who embody weak wills. However, in the
passages we have examined here, Nietzsche does not encourage
us to be like these men, but like the overman. In such passages,
he describes the overman as a stronger, more merciful, and
braver being than the masters. Thus, I ﬁnd that Nietzsche does
not espouse cruel and violent affects that we would normally
think of as horrible. Rather, he encourages us to be stronger
than this and to aspire to become overmen, those who have no
need or desire to dominate weaker men.
Conclusion: Overcoming Moral Chaos
Through the examination of Nietzsche’s works and scholars’
arguments on the subject, I ﬁnd that Nietzsche does not fall
into the problem of moral chaos through his philosophy of
the will to power. In other words, Nietzsche does not propose
violence, murder, or torture of others as a viable or worthwhile
form of the will to power, and thus is not led to a chaotic society,
where all individuals struggle solely for their own personal
advancement by any means necessary. Instead, he inspires us
to become overmen, who are individuals which have such
attributes as strength, bravery, and manners, and who aspire
to live in a society in which there may be mercy for others,
not domination of them. Nietzsche here is advocating a society
that is not chaotic or psychotic, but instead strong, merciful
and always overcoming itself so as to advance its laws and its
people. Its members will reach beyond revenge and punishment,
and be able to have healthy conﬂict with one another. This is
Nietzsche’s ideal society. It is formed by overmen, and therefore
does not fall into the problem of moral chaos.

BRIDGEWATER STATE COLLEGE

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my mentor, Dr. William J. Devlin, for
his guidance throughout this project. I would also like to thank
the Adrian Tinsley Program for the opportunity to conduct
this research.
References
Clark, Maudemarie. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. New York:
Cambridge UP, 1990.
Danto, Arthur C. Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York: Cambridge UP,
2005.
Kaufmann, Walter. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th
ed. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1974.
Klein, Wayne. Nietzsche and the Promise of Philosophy. Albany, New
York: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New
York: Vintage Books, 1974.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morals. Ed. Walter Kaufman.
Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage
Books, 1989.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Vintage Books, 1966.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Trans.
R.J. Hollingdale. London, England: The Penguin Group, 2003.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale and
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967
Richardson, John. Nietzsche’s System. New York: Oxford UP, 1996
Welshon, Rex. The Philosophy of Nietzsche. Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s UP, 2004.
Williams, Linda L. “Will to Power in Nietzsche’s Published Works
and the Nachlass.” Journal of The History of Ideas. Vol. 57. No. 3.
University of Pennsylvania Press.1996. 447-463. 27 July, 2009.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/3653949>.

Endnotes
I will use the following abbreviations for Nietzsche’s works: BGE: Beyond
Good and Evil; GM: On the Genealogy of Morals; GS: The Gay Science; TI:
Twilight of the Idols; WP: The Will to Power; Z: Thus Spoke Zarathustra
1

The overman is the free spirit who actualizes the drive towards selfovercoming, and lives his or her life authentically.
2

Nietzsche refers to master morality as the morality which endorses nobility,
strength, and honor, and the domination of the weak. He contrasts this
kind of morality with slave morality, the morality that espouses weak virtues
such as vengeance, pity, and the herd mentality. See Essays 1 and 2 from the
Genealogy of Morals and Chapter 9 from Beyond Good and Evil for Nietzsche’s
assessment of these two moralities.
3
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